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In this Editorial, the authors explain the 
context of this special issue of the Bulletin for 
International Taxation. The fundamental premise 
of the BEPS project is that a coordination 
of national responses to BEPS can both 
eliminate double non-taxation and protect 
against material unrelieved double taxation. 
The articles in this issue further a dialogue 
among tax policymakers, taxpayers, advisors 
and academics that is critical to achieve this 
objective.
In January 2014, the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and 
Public Finance together with the International Network 
for Tax Research (INTR) hosted in Munich a two-day 
interdisciplinary conference1 on the OECD’ s Action Plan 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (the “BEPS Action 
Plan”).2 The conference was attended by scholars in tax law 
and public finance, practitioners, members of the OECD 
Centre for Tax Policy Secretariat and country delegates 
involved in the BEPS project. Speakers prepared papers 
to frame the discussion of issues raised by action items 
in the BEPS Report3 and approaches to addressing those 
issues. This issue is comprised of papers first presented at 
the Munich conference.
The BEPS Action Plan, endorsed at the G20 meeting of 
heads of government in Saint Petersburg in September 
2013, sets out 15 “action” items, with varying specific-
ity in deliverable outputs, and an aggressive time line for 
completion of the actions. A summary chart of the action 
items, the proposed outputs and the deadlines for comple-
tion are provided in Appendix A. The action items may be 
very generally placed into the following groupings:
–  rules for the digital economy (Action 1);
–  prevention of double non-taxation (Actions 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6);
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3. OECD,  Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013), Interna-
tional Organizations’ Documentation IBFD, also available at www.oecd.
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–  alignment of economic activity and taxation (Actions 
7, 8, 9, 10);
–  tax transparency and dispute resolution (Actions 11, 
12, 13, 14); and
–  efficient and effective implementation (Action 15).
The international income taxation problems addressed 
in the BEPS Action Plan are among the most difficult 
issues confronted by the international tax regime in recent 
decades. These include: transfer pricing, inconsistent 
entity and instrument classification, the rise of the digital 
economy, increasing number and complexity of disputes 
and the limited effectiveness of existing anti-abuse rules. 
The OECD, the European Union, the United Nations, 
other international organizations and their member coun-
tries have already devoted substantial efforts to address 
issues similar, if not identical, to those covered by the BEPS 
Action Plan.4 What is different this time?
The BEPS project has acquired urgency from political-
level visibility of the failure of cross-border taxation rules 
to keep up with the realities of modern commerce and 
finance. The extent of corporate tax avoidance highlighted 
in legislative hearings,5 press reports6 and exposes7 by non-
governmental organizations has prompted public outcries, 
4.  A full bibliography of reports on prior efforts to address BEPS issues 
would run for pages. As one example, the OECD addressed transfer 
pricing in 1979 its report Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises. 
It published major revisions to the transfer pricing guidelines in July 2010. 
See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD 2010), International Organizations’ Documen-
tation IBFD. As another example, in 1987, the OECD published Interna-
tional Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Four Related Studies. The four studies 
covered such topics as use of base and conduit companies and counter-
measures to the use of tax havens. Proposals included measures to increase 
transparency and CFC legislation. In 2011, the OECD published Tackling 
Aggressive Tax Planning through Improved Transparency and Disclosure. 
Many more examples of consideration of BEPS issues could be added to 
these examples.
5.  See, for example, US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Hearing 
on Offshore Profit Shifting and the US Tax Code (20 Sept. 2012); House 
of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, HM Revenue & Customs: 
Annual Report and Accounts 2011–12, Nineteenth Report of Session 
2012–13 (HC 716, 3 Dec. 2012); US Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
ment Affairs, Hearing on Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code 
– Part 2 (Apple Inc.) (21 May 2013); US Senate Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernment Affairs, Hearing on Caterpillar’ s Offshore Tax Strategy (1 Apr. 
2014).
6.  J. Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loop-
holes, Bloomberg (21 Oct. 2010); T. Bergin, Starbucks’ s continental de-tax 
café culture, Reuters (1 Nov. 2012); J. Ford, S. Gainsbury & V. Houlder, 
Cadbury: The great tax fudge, Financial Times (20 June 2013) (Cadbury 
paid an average of GBP 6.4 million a year in current tax on its ongoing 
UK operations, despite annual British profits of GBP 100 million and 
turnover of more than GBP 1 billion).
7. ActionAid,  Calling Time: Why SAB Miller Should Stop Dodging Taxes In 
Africa (Nov. 2010).
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Editorialparticularly in Europe, to an extent not seen since before 
the Reagan/Thatcher period. Prior initiatives to curb 
international business tax avoidance have been driven 
largely by bureaucrats and policymakers, and, occasion-
ally, by politicians’ search for revenue from politically vul-
nerable targets, including inbound and outbound foreign 
direct investment. To have pressure from the public is rare 
in relation to business tax issues, and the disclosures relat-
ing to Cadbury and Starbucks, Apple and Google as well as 
General Electric, to name just a few examples, have pushed 
politicians to respond. Political attention has reached not 
only finance ministers8 but heads of state.9 It is difficult to 
overstate the political significance of G20 heads of state 
communiqués including BEPS as an issue to be addressed 
by member countries.
The political “drivers” of BEPS are a symptom of deeper 
problems with an international income tax regime whose 
contours were formed in the 1920s and have not changed 
materially since. International tax rules were largely devel-
oped under a bilateral paradigm of a well-developed and 
extensive residence country taxing system and a source 
country which fully exercised its taxing rights. This is the 
paradigm that underlies bilateral income tax treaties. The 
predominant focus of this regime has been to avoid or 
mitigate international double taxation.10 From the begin-
ning, the fundamental division of income between resi-
dence and source countries (whether adopted unilater-
ally or by treaty) has been that the source country has the 
primary right to tax income from that country and gen-
erally will tax business income on a net income basis and 
impose a withholding tax on interest, dividends, royalties 
and similar income. The residence country may tax the 
same income as well, but it commits to mitigate double 
taxation through allowing a credit for source country tax 
or exempting the income. The non-discrimination prin-
ciple generally restricts the source country from treating 
foreign-owned businesses worse than a source country 
business.
The bilateral paradigm does not reflect the predominant 
reality of multinational tax planning today, which rou-
tinely involves use of intermediary entities located in tax-
favourable countries. While this is not new, as evidenced 
by long-standing concerns noted previously regarding use 
8.  G. Osborne, P. Moscovici & W. Schäuble, We are determined that multina-
tionals will not avoid tax, Financial Times, (16 Feb. 2013).
9.  See Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders Declaration 50 (Sept. 2013) (support-
ing “the G20/OECD BEPS project” and calling on “member countries to 
examine how our own domestic laws contribute to BEPS and to ensure 
that international and our own tax rules do not allow or encourage mul-
tinational enterprises to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions.”); Los Cabos Finance Ministers Commu-
niqué 48 (June 2012) (“We reiterate the need to prevent base erosion and 
profit shifting and we will follow with attention the ongoing work of the 
OECD in this area.”).
10.  Professor Ault calls attention to the 1927 Report of the Committee of 
Experts, which noted “the necessity of dealing with the questions of tax 
evasion and double taxation in coordination with each other.” See Report 
by Committee of Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion 23 (League 
of Nations 1927). As Professor Ault has also observed, however, “[M]ost 
of the effort in the ensuing years has been focused more on ensuring relief 
from double taxation than making sure that double non-taxation does not 
take place.” H.J. Ault, Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of In-
ternational Tax Principles, 70 Tax Notes Int’l 1195 (17 June 2013).
of conduit companies and tax havens, use of intermedi-
aries has expanded exponentially as the deconstruction 
and separation of business processes, both within the same 
business enterprise and among unrelated business enter-
prises, has become routine in order to maximize operating, 
financial and tax efficiencies of multinational enterprises 
(MNE). Under pressure from public stock markets and 
private equity fund investors, public and private business 
enterprises have also changed their orientation to taxation, 
treating tax like any other cost of business which should 
be minimized. In addition to devoting resources to com-
pliance with accounting and tax requirements of multiple 
jurisdictions, multinational businesses devote substantial 
energy to reducing or avoiding taxes. Aggregate evidence 
suggests that many non-resource MNEs have been very 
successful in achieving effective rates of tax well below the 
nominal or “headline” rate in residence countries.11
But MNE behaviour is only one side of the coin. Interna-
tional profit shifting and base erosion envisaged by large 
business enterprises would be ineffective without coun-
tries offering preferential tax rules, including low/no tax 
regimes for particular taxpayers or income categories and 
benign provisions on profit measurement. To put it differ-
ently: MNE tax avoidance is just the flipside of harmful tax 
competition. Against this background, the issues raised in 
the OECD 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition12 
resurface in the course of the BEPS debate and the Action 
Plan invites increased discipline in relation to preferential 
tax regimes.13 A case in point is the “Patent Box” which has 
become fashionable particularly in different EU countries 
but also outside the European Union. Beyond the patent 
box issue, the European Commission has committed itself 
to support the OECD process,14 addressing good tax gov-
ernance in third countries as well as trying to employ their 
own instruments (State Aid, Code of Conduct) in order to 
abolish the most aggressive tax legislation or fiscal admin-
istrative practices used by Member States to attract foreign 
business.
The BEPS Action Plan identifies several reasons why base 
erosion and profit shifting needs to be addressed. With 
11.  Grubert and Altshuler report that that in 2006 45.9% of earnings of US 
controlled foreign corporations that reported positive income and some 
foreign tax was taxed at a foreign effective rate of less than 10%. H. Grubert 
& R. Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for 
the Reform of International Tax, 66 Nat. Tax J. 671, Table 3 at p. 699 (Sept. 
2013). It seems unlikely that MNEs from countries that largely exempt 
foreign earnings would pay higher foreign effective rates of tax, but, if 
so, it is not evident to these observers why that would be the case. For an 
example of work with non-US data suggesting equivalent responses by 
German multinationals, see J.M. Mintz & A.J. Weichenrieder, The Indirect 
Side of Direct Investment p. 126 (MIT 2010).
12. OECD,  Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Issue (OECD 1998).
13. OECD,  BEPS Action Plan, supra n. 2, Action 5.
14.  European Commission, Commission recommendation on aggres-
sive tax planning, C(2012) 8806 final (6 Dec. 2012), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_
fraud_evasion/c_2012_8806_en.pdf; European Commission, Com-
mission recommendation regarding measures intended to encourage 
third countries to apply minimum standards of good governance in tax 
matters, C(2012) 8805 final (6 Dec. 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/
 c_2012_8805_en.pdf. 
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Plan observes:
Many governments have to cope with less revenue and a higher 
cost to ensure compliance. Moreover, Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) undermines the integrity of the tax system, as 
the public, the media and some taxpayers deem reported low cor-
porate taxes to be unfair. In developing countries, the lack of tax 
revenue leads to critical under-funding of public investment that 
could help promote economic growth. Overall resource alloca-
tion, affected by tax-motivated behaviour, is not optimal.
[...] 
MNEs may face significant reputational risk if their effective tax 
rate is viewed as being too low. At the same time, different busi-
nesses may assess such risk differently, and failing to take advan-
tage of legal opportunities to reduce an enterprise’ s tax burden 
can put it at a competitive disadvantage. Similarly, corporations 
that operate only in domestic markets, including family-owned 
businesses or new innovative companies, have difficulty compet-
ing with MNEs that have the ability to shift their profits across 
borders to avoid or reduce tax. Fair competition is harmed by the 
distortions induced by BEPS.15
Business is also rightly concerned that political pressures 
to address base erosion and profit shifting will result in 
uncoordinated solutions that risk substantial increases 
in disputes and risk of unresolved double taxation. This 
concern reinforces the wisdom of the 1927 Committee 
of Experts Report’  s identification of the intimate link 
between double taxation and “tax evasion”.
The advancing sophistication of international business 
structuring increases pressures for domestic tax rules to 
take account of non-taxation or materially reduced taxa-
tion of income, particularly in intermediary countries, 
whether as a source country in relation to potentially 
deductible payments to intermediary entities or as a resi-
dence country in relation to income shifted to an inter-
mediary controlled foreign company. The outcomes of 
the BEPS Action Plan will likely affect whether countries 
adopt an “anti-abuse” approach, for example by focusing 
on related party and “structured” arrangements, or whether 
more comprehensive approaches will be developed.
Anti-abuse approaches may mitigate costs of transition 
and limit effects on existing business practices. It may be 
observed, however, that frequent and ongoing changes to 
anti-abuse regimes have not proven sufficiently effective. 
Moreover, the costs of ongoing incremental changes in 
law in the aggregate may outweigh the burden of a more 
comprehensive change. Comprehensive change, though, 
is difficult to design and to implement. The alternatives 
of anti-abuse and comprehensive solutions need not be 
mutually inconsistent. The timing also changes matters. 
The timelines set in the BEPS Action Plan make it very 
difficult to develop comprehensive changes, but it would 
be a reasonable approach to strengthen anti-abuse rules 
in the short term and take appropriate time to reflect on 
and implement more difficult comprehensive changes. 
Moreover, preferential tax regimes should be identified 
and repealed following pressure by the international tax 
community. Such a staggered approach is already reflected 
15. OECD,  BEPS Action Plan, supra n. 2, at p. 8.
to some extent in the BEPS Action Plan. Moreover, an iter-
ative approach allows time to reveal how developments, 
such as automatic information exchange and technologi-
cal advances, might permit administration of more com-
prehensive proposals that today might not seem feasible.
Whichever approaches are ultimately adopted from the 
important BEPS Action Plan discussion drafts that already 
have emerged, and those that will come, the fundamental 
promise of the BEPS project is multilateral coordination 
of country responses. This is a highly significant objective; 
compromise and deferred implementation of proposals 
requiring technical development and business adaptations 
is appropriate to achieve a coordinated outcome. At the 
end of the day, it is important that the efforts to eliminate 
double non-taxation do not themselves result in material 
unrelieved double taxation and the attendant burden on 
cross-border activities.
While the pressures to address BEPS are indeed differ-
ent from the past and justify urgency, the difficulty of the 
issues has not diminished. Indeed, along with the com-
plexities of modern businesses and economies, the techni-
cal difficulties of addressing BEPS issues have increased as 
well. Though the BEPS Action Plan calls for outputs to be 
complete by December 2015, the work of implementation 
of actual legislation will take far longer. Moreover, as with 
any significant legislative endeavour, ongoing dialogue 
among tax policymakers and administrators, affected tax-
payers, advisors and academics is critical to achieve high 
quality legislation. Decisions that seem wise at one stage 
of the process may be discarded at another and propos-
als rejected at one stage, with re-working or as a result of 
technological advances, sometimes may be found the best 
available alternative at a later stage.
The papers presented at the Munich conference and in this 
issue have been and will continue to be useful resources 
for policymakers and their technical staff as they work 
through the intricacies of rules to flesh out the BEPS 
Action Plan and, subsequently, to attempt to implement 
the proposals through legislation. Referring to the cate-
gorization set out above, articles in this issue touch on all 
the major categories except the development of a multi-
lateral instrument.
Professor Walter Hellerstein’ s contribution, “Jurisdiction 
to Tax in the Digital Economy: Permanent and Other 
Establishments”, underscores the importance of admin-
istrative concerns in designing rules for taxing the digital 
economy, in particular, aligning assignment of the tax base 
with the ability to enforce collection of the tax in the juris-
diction to which the base is assigned. Professor Hellerstein 
reminds us that “tax administration is tax policy,”16 a lesson 
that tax policymakers ignore at their peril.
The preponderance of the articles in this issue addresses 
avoidance of double non-taxation. Two papers address 
16.  Professor Hellerstein attributes this observation to M. Casanegra de 
Jantscher, Administering the VAT in: Value Added Taxation in Developing 
Countries p. 179 (M. Gillis, C.S. Shoup & G.P. Sicat eds., World Bank 1990) 
(emphasis in original).
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trage. Professor Jürgen Lüdicke’ s article, “‘Tax Arbitrage’ 
with Hybrid Entities: Challenges and Responses”, provides 
a deep review of the formidable technical challenges of 
designing approaches to the use of hybrid entities so as to 
account for legitimate timing differences and avoid double 
taxation. Stephen Edge, in “Base Erosion and Profit Shift-
ing: A Roadmap for Reform – Tax Arbitrage with Hybrid 
Instruments”, outlines the broader context in which use 
of “hybrid instruments” occurs and in which any solution 
must operate. Edge supports targeted rather than expan-
sive approaches to these issues. Professor Johanna Hey 
observes, in “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting and Inter-
est Expenditure”, that interest-related issues cross multiple 
action items in the BEPS Action Plan. Her paper provides 
a review of the issues posed by the deductibility of interest, 
a breakdown of existing measures taken to limiting exces-
sive deductions, the legal constraints on potential changes 
and a thorough review of policy options.
Professor Mitchell A. Kane undertakes a careful review of 
the rationale for controlled foreign company (CFC) legis-
lation in “The Role of CFC Legislation in the OECD BEPS 
Project” and makes recommendations for the appropri-
ate scope of CFC rules in the multilateral context of the 
BEPS project, relating the application of the CFC rules to 
the treatment of the payments received by the intermedi-
ary CFC in the source jurisdiction. Professor Guglielmo 
Maisto reviews the intersection of corporate residence 
rules, CFC legislation and hybrid issues in “Controlled 
Foreign Company Legislation, Corporate Residence and 
Anti-Hybrid Arrangement Rules” and makes observations 
on how proposals to address these action items should be 
coordinated. Professor Rosanne Altshuler reviews inter-
nation competitiveness in the context of identifying 
harmful tax practices in “Inter-Nation Competitiveness: 
A Discussion Paper on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting”. 
Her contribution addresses the ill-defined term “competi-
tiveness” and highlights that much remains to be explored 
in understanding how international tax rules affect a 
country’ s welfare. Two of the articles in this issue cover 
issues relating to the alignment of economic activity and 
taxation. Our co-author, Munich conference organizer 
and INTR colleague Professor Wolfgang Schön decon-
structs economic and tax law aspects of taxing “risk” in 
“International Taxation of Risk”. By careful analysis of the 
economics of risk and carefully relating them to how in-
ternational taxation rules apply to a firm, Professor Schön 
makes an important contribution and provides direction 
for how transfer pricing rules may be adapted to cope with 
the challenges of allocating risk premiums within a multi-
national firm. J. Scott Wilkie’ s “Intangibles and Location 
Benefits (Customer Base)” observes that intangibles “may 
lie at the heart of any effective recalibration of how inter-
national taxation ‘rules’ and guidance respond to changing 
patterns and characteristics of multinational and global 
business and businesses”. His article takes a deep dive into 
the concept of an intangible as a legal construct and as a 
component of value and draws conclusions for the BEPS 
work in related areas.
Two papers by academics with expertise in public finance 
and financial accounting address the issues relating to the 
potential effects on profit shifting of increased transpar-
ency through country-by-country reporting. Maria There-
sia Evers, Ina Meier and Professor Christoph Spengel’  s 
paper, “Transparency in Financial Reporting: Is Country-
by-Country Reporting Suitable To Combat International 
Profit Shifting?” is sceptical that the benefits of country-
by-country reporting will outweigh the costs and favours 
alternative measures. Professor Jennifer Blouin’ s “Trans-
parency and Financial Accounting” reviews what can be 
gleaned about profit shifting today from financial report-
ing and other data sources and raises issues that should be 
considered in an enhanced reporting regime.
We applaud the contributions of the scholars and practi-
tioners who have contributed to this issue. For the BEPS 
project to succeed, it is essential that thoughtful and objec-
tive work be undertaken to assist policymakers in address-
ing the most difficult issues in international taxation. We 
express our thanks to the OECD, for encouraging this 
work through the International Network for Tax Research 
and to the other co-sponsors, the Max Planck Institute for 
Tax Law and Public Finance and the Harvard Fund for Tax 
and Fiscal Policy Research, for their financial and logisti-
cal support for the conference.
Appendix A
No. Issue and Action Output(s) Due Date(s)
1 Address the tax challenges of the digital economy Report Sept. 2014
2 Neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements 
Domestic law design; OECD Model 
changes
Sept. 2014/ Sept. 2014
3 Strengthen CFC rules Domestic law design Sept. 2015
4 Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other 
financial payments 
Domestic law design; OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines (TPG) changes
Sept. 2014/ Sept. 2015
5 Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking 
into account transparency and substance 
Review practices; Expand to non-OECD; 
Revise criteria
Sept. 2014/ Sept. 2015/ 
Dec. 2015
6 Prevent treaty abuse  Domestic law design; OECD Model 
changes
Sept. 2014/ Sept. 2014
7 Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE status  OECD Model changes Sept. 2015
8 Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with 
value creation: (i) intangibles and (ii) hard-to-value 
intangibles
TPG changes; possible OECD Model 
changes
Sept. 2014/ Sept. 2015
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9 Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with 
value creation: risks and capital 
TPG changes; possible OECD Model 
changes
Sept. 2015
10 Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with 
value creation: other high-risk transactions 
TPG changes; possible OECD Model 
changes
Sept. 2015
11 Establish methodologies to collect and analyse data 
on BEPS and the actions to address it 
Recommendations Sept. 2015
12 Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax 
planning arrangements 
Recommendations Sept. 2015
13 Re-examine transfer pricing documentation  TPG changes; Domestic law design Sept. 2014
14 Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective  OECD Model changes Sept. 2014
15 Develop a multilateral instrument  Report; Develop instrument Sept. 2014/ Dec. 2015
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